Thailand and
the 9/11 Commission Report
- July 30, 2004
Thailand does figure prominently in the recently
released 9/11 Commission Report--principally as
a meeting point for the terrorists because of
lax visa rules and the ability of watched persons
to "disappear into the streets of Bangkok."
Thai officials have already responded to the report
noting that the days of cursory or nonexistent
visa rules are long over. Below are all the passages
with references to Thailand:
p. 58 - Bin Ladin now had a vision of himself
as head of an international jihad confederation.
In Sudan, he established an “Islamic Army
Shura” that was to serve as the coordinating
body for the consortium of terrorist groups with
which he was forging alliances. It was composed
of his own al Qaeda Shura together with leaders
or representatives of terrorist organizations
that were still independent. In building this
Islamic army, he enlisted groups from Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya,
Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea.Al Qaeda
also established cooperative but less formal relationships
with other extremist groups from these same countries;
from the African states of Chad, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, and Uganda; and from the Southeast Asian
states of Burma,Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Bin Ladin maintained connections in the Bosnian
conflict as well. The groundwork for a true global
terrorist network was being laid.
p. 150 - At this point, late 1998 to early
1999, planning for the 9/11 operation began in
earnest.Yet while the 9/11 project occupied the
bulk of KSM’s attention, he continued to
consider other possibilities for terrorist attacks.
For example, he sent al Qaeda operative Issa al
Britani to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to learn about
the jihad in Southeast Asia from Hambali.
Thereafter, KSM claims, at Bin Ladin’s direction
in early 2001, he sent Britani to the United States
to case potential economic and “Jewish”
targets in New York City. Furthermore, during
the summer of 2001, KSM approached Bin Ladin with
the idea of recruiting a Saudi Arabian air force
pilot to commandeer a Saudi fighter jet and attack
the Israeli city of Eilat. Bin Ladin reportedly
liked this proposal, but he instructed KSM to
concentrate on the 9/11 operation first. Similarly,
KSM’s proposals to Atef around this same
time for attacks in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia,
and the Maldives were never executed, although
Hambali’s Jemaah Islamiah operatives did
some casing of possible targets.
p. 156 - This part of the operation has
been confirmed by Khallad, who said that they
contemplated hijacking several planes, probably
originating in Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong,
or Malaysia, and using Yemenis who would not need
pilot training because they would simply down
the planes.All the planes hijacked in the United
States and East Asia were to be crashed or exploded
at about the same time to maximize the attack’s
psychological impact.
p. 158 -
On December 31, Khallad flew from Kuala Lumpur
to Bangkok; the next day, he flew to Hong Kong
aboard a U.S. airliner. He flew in first class,
which he realized was a mistake because this seating
assignment on that flight did not afford him a
view of the cockpit. He claims to have done what
he could to case the flight, testing security
by carrying a box cutter in his toiletries kit
onto the flight to Hong Kong. Khallad returned
to Bangkok the following day. At the airport,
the security officials searched his carry-on bag
and even opened the toiletries kit, but just glanced
at the contents and let him pass. On this flight,
Khallad waited until most of the first-class passengers
were dozing, then got up and removed the kit from
his carry-on. None of the flight attendants took
notice.
p. 159 - While in Kuala Lumpur, Khallad
wanted to go to Singapore to meet Nibras and Fahd
al Quso, two of the operatives in Nashiri’s
ship-bombing operation. An attempt to execute
that plan by attacking the USS The Sullivans had
failed just a few days earlier. Nibras and Quso
were bringing Khallad money from Yemen, but were
stopped in Bangkok because they lacked visas to
continue on to Singapore. Also unable to enter
Singapore, Khallad moved the meeting to Bangkok.
Hazmi and Mihdhar decided to go there as well,
reportedly because they thought it would enhance
their cover as tourists to have passport stamps
from a popular tourist destination such as Thailand.With
Hambali’s help, the three obtained tickets
for a flight to Bangkok and left Kuala Lumpur
together. Abu Bara did not have a visa permitting
him to return to Pakistan, so he traveled to Yemen
instead.
p. 181 - On January 8, the surveillance
teams reported that three of the Arabs had suddenly
left Kuala Lumpur on a short flight to Bangkok.
They identified one as Mihdhar. They later learned
that one of his companions was named Alhazmi,
although it was not yet known that he was “Nawaf.”The
only identifier available for the third person
was part of a name—Salahsae. In Bangkok,
CIA officers received the information too late
to track the three men as they came in, and the
travelers disappeared into the streets of Bangkok.
The Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had briefed
the CIA leadership on the gathering in Kuala Lumpur,
and the information had been passed on to Berger
and the NSC staff and to Director Freeh and others
at the FBI (though the FBI noted that the CIA
had the lead and would let the FBI know if a domestic
angle arose).The head of the Bin Ladin unit kept
providing updates, unaware at first even that
the Arabs had left Kuala Lumpur, let alone that
their trail had been lost in Bangkok. When this
bad news arrived, the names were put on a Thai
watchlist so that Thai authorities could inform
the United States if any of them departed from
Thailand.
Several weeks later, CIA officers in Kuala Lumpur
prodded colleagues in Bangkok for additional information
regarding the three travelers. In early March
2000, Bangkok reported that Nawaf al Hazmi, now
identified for the first time with his full name,
had departed on January 15 on a United Airlines
flight to Los Angeles. As for Khalid al Mihdhar,
there was no report of his departure even though
he had accompanied Hazmi on the United flight
to Los Angeles. No one outside of the Counterterrorist
Center was told any of this. The CIA did not try
to register Mihdhar or Hazmi with the State Department’s
TIPOFF watchlist—either in January, when
word arrived of Mihdhar’s visa, or in March,
when word came that Hazmi, too, had had a U.S.
visa and a ticket to Los Angeles.
p. 190 - THE ATTACK ON THE USS COLE...
The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda
operation, supervised directly by Bin Ladin. He
chose the target and location of the attack, selected
the suicide operatives, and provided the money
needed to purchase explosives and equipment.
Nashiri was the field commander and managed the
operation in Yemen. Khallad helped in Yemen until
he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity
and freed with Bin Ladin’s help, as we also
mentioned earlier. Local al Qaeda coordinators
included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who
was supposed to film the attack from a nearby
apartment.The two suicide operatives chosen were
Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known
as Nibras. Nibras and Quso delivered money to
Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad’s January
2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.
p. 215 - In chapter 5 we described the
Southeast Asia travels of Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid
al Mihdhar, and others in January 2000 on the
first part of the “planes operation.”
In that chapter we also described how Mihdhar
was spotted in Kuala Lumpur early in January 2000,
along with associates who were not identified,
and then was lost to sight when the group passed
through Bangkok.
p. 244 - Binalshibh contacted Atta upon
arriving in Malaysia and found a change in plan.
Atta could not travel because he was too busy
helping the new arrivals settle in the United
States.After remaining in Malaysia for approximately
three weeks, Binalshibh went to Bangkok for a
few days before returning to Germany. He and Atta
agreed to meet later at a location to be determined.
p. 245 - Before Binalshibh left Spain,
he gave Atta eight necklaces and eight bracelets
that Atta had asked him to buy when he was recently
in Bangkok, believing that if the hijackers were
clean shaven and well dressed, others would think
them wealthy Saudis
and give them less notice.
p. 266 - Almost one year after the original
trail had been lost in Bangkok, the FBI and the
CIA were working on the investigation of the Cole
bombing.
They learned of the link between a captured conspirator
and a person called “Khallad.” They
also learned that Khallad was a senior security
official for Bin Ladin who had helped direct the
bombing (we introduced Khallad in chapter 5, and
returned to his role in the Cole bombing in chapter
6).
p. 268 - “John’s” review
of the Kuala Lumpur meeting did set off some more
sharing of information, getting the attention
of an FBI analyst whom we will call “Jane.”
“Jane” was assigned to the FBI’s
Cole investigation. She knew that another terrorist
involved in that operation, Fahd al Quso, had
traveled to Bangkok in January 2000 to give money
to Khallad.
p. 353 - When the travelers left Kuala
Lumpur for Bangkok, local officials were able
to identify one of the travelers as Khalid al
Mihdhar. After the flight left, they learned that
one of his companions had the name Alhazmi. But
the officials did not know what that name meant.
The information arrived at Bangkok too late to
track these travelers as they came in. Had the
authorities there already been keeping an eye
out for Khalid al Mihdhar as part of a general
regional or worldwide alert, they might have tracked
him coming in. Had they been alerted to look for
a possible companion named Nawaf al Hazmi, they
might have noticed him too. Instead, they were
notified only after Kuala Lumpur sounded the alarm.
By that time, the travelers had already disappeared
into the streets of Bangkok.
On January 12, the head of the CIA’s al Qaeda
unit told his bosses that surveillance in Kuala
Lumpur was continuing. He may not have known that
in fact Mihdhar and his companions had dispersed
and the tracking was falling apart. U.S. officials
in Bangkok regretfully reported the bad news on
January 13. The names they had were put on a watchlist
in Bangkok, so that Thai authorities might notice
if the men left the country. On January 14, the
head of the CIA’s al Qaeda unit again updated
his bosses, telling them that officials were continuing
to track the suspicious individuals who had now
dispersed to various countries.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence of any tracking
efforts actually being undertaken by anyone after
the Arabs disappeared into Bangkok. No other effort
was made to create other opportunities to spot
these Arab travelers in case the screen in Bangkok
failed. Just from the evidence in Mihdhar’s
passport, one of the logical possible destinations
and interdiction points would have been the United
States.Yet no one alerted the INS or the FBI to
look for these individuals. They arrived, unnoticed,
in Los Angeles on January 15.
In early March 2000, Bangkok reported that Nawaf
al Hazmi, now identified for the first time with
his full name, had departed on January 15 on a
United Airlines flight to Los Angeles. Since the
CIA did not appreciate the significance of that
name or notice the cable,we have found no evidence
that this information was sent to the FBI.
p. 355 - Operational Opportunities... 2.
January 2000: the CIA does not develop a transnational
plan for tracking Mihdhar and his associates so
that they could be followed to Bangkok and onward,
including the United States.
p.356 - The director of the Counterterrorist
Center at the time, Cofer Black, recalled to us
that this operation was one among many and that,
at the time, it was “considered interesting,
but not heavy water yet.” He recalled the
failure to get the word to Bangkok fast enough,
but has no evident recollection of why the case
then dissolved, unnoticed.
The next level down, the director of the al Qaeda
unit in CIA at the time recalled that he did not
think it was his job to direct what should or
should not be done. He did not pay attention when
the individuals dispersed and things fell apart.There
was no conscious decision to stop the operation
after the trail was temporarily lost in Bangkok.
He acknowledged,however, that perhaps there had
been a letdown for his overworked staff after
the extreme tension and long hours in the period
of the millennium alert.
p. 366 - In talking with American and foreign
government officials and military officers on
the front lines fighting terrorists today, we
asked them: If you were a terrorist leader today,
where would you locate your base? Some of the
same places come up again and again on their lists:
• western Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border region
• southern or western Afghanistan
• the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi
Arabia and Yemen, and the nearby Horn of Africa,
including Somalia and extending southwest into
Kenya
• Southeast Asia, from Thailand to the southern
Philippines to Indonesia
• West Africa, including Nigeria and Mali
• European cities with expatriate Muslim
communities, especially cities in central and
eastern Europe where security forces and border
controls are less effective
p. 404 - Consider this hypothetical case.The
NSA discovers that a suspected terrorist is traveling
to Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.The NCTC should draw
on joint intelligence resources, including its
own NSA counterterrorism experts, to analyze the
identities and possible destinations of these
individuals. Informed by this analysis, the NCTC
would then organize and plan the management of
the case, drawing on the talents and differing
kinds of experience among the several agency representatives
assigned to it—assigning tasks to the CIA
overseas, to Homeland Security watching entry
points into the United States, and to the FBI.
If military assistance might be needed, the Special
Operations Command could be asked to develop an
appropriate concept for such an operation. The
NCTC would be accountable for tracking the progress
of the case, ensuring that the plan evolved with
it, and integrating the information into a warning.The
NCTC would be responsible for being sure that
intelligence gathered from the activities in the
field became part of the government’s institutional
memory about Islamist terrorist personalities,
organizations, and possible means of attack.
In each case the involved agency would make its
own senior managers aware of what it was being
asked to do. If those agency heads objected, and
the issue could not easily be resolved, then the
disagreement about roles and missions could be
brought before the National Security Council and
the president.
p. 493 - According to Khallad, Thailand,
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia were likely
origins of the flights because Yemenis did not
need visas to enter them.
